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Abstract 
This study tries to find which EU member states and candidate countries can 
sustain a currency link. I use Bayoumi and Eichengreen’s procedure of two-step least 
squares cross-section regression analysis for estimating exchange rate variation 
among 26 European countries, integrating domestic political factors into an Optimal 
Currency Area analysis framework.  
Excluding political variables a currency union is found sustainable among 
combinations of 2-6 countries, none including more than one major EU economy. 
Economically, Germany is the leading core country, followed by France and the UK. 
Including political variables Germany and eight other small countries are singled out, 
while the UK becomes an almost equal alternative core to Germany, with six potential 
currency partners. Considering domestic politics France and Italy are unstable Euro-
zone members. The candidate countries are a long way from a sustainable currency 
union with the EU.  
                                                 
* Assistant professor, Department of Political Science, Tel Aviv University, P.O. Box 39040, Tel Aviv 
69978, ISRAEL. Fax: (972) 3-640-9515. E-mail address: talsadeh@post.tau.ac.il. A preliminary 
draft of this paper was written while the author was a postdoctoral fellow at the Davis Institute for 
International Relations, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. The author acknowledges the support 
of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation and the helpful suggestions of Shlomo Avineri, Jeffrey Frieden, 
Nathan Sussman and participants in the Department’s seminar.    2
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In December 2002 the European Council decided that ten new countries will 
join the European Union (EU) by 2004 and two more will do so by 2007.
1 As the 
accession of these candidates looms closer, so does their eventual adoption of the 
single currency. Participation in Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in Europe in 
general is compulsory for all EU member states. On the other hand, participation in 
the Euro-zone (i.e. actually adopting the Euro) depends on fulfilling a specified set of 
formal economic convergence criteria and for most candidates requires in practice 
also a lengthy process of economic integration with the EU. There are also 
institutional criteria for participation in EMU, which are part of the vast pre-accession 
requirements.
2 As of June 2002 all twelve candidate countries had formally fulfilled 
these institutional criteria.
3 However, their ability to satisfy the economic convergence 
criteria spelled out in the Maastricht Treaty, regarding exchange rate volatility, the 
levels of inflation and long-term interest rates and fiscal discipline is less clear.
4 
Since the EU member states must eventually adopt the single currency, their 
participation in the Euro-zone is a result of their political decision to join the EU.
5 The 
candidate countries have, at least until recently, been very eager to join the EU and 
seem to have given little thought to the economic and political consequences of 
participating in EMU. However, the EMU project is known to have produced 
considerable economic and domestic political pressures on the EU member states in 
the 1990s. In addition, as the accession negotiations unfolded, and after a decade of 
slow and painful transition, domestic political pressure has been building up in the 
candidate countries with regard to accession and eventual membership in the Euro-
zone. The purpose of this study is to find whether the candidate countries can adopt 
the Euro in a sustainable way, and which EU member states and candidates are more 
politically and economically compatible with the single currency area than others. 
Does an all-European currency union make sense?  
In the 1990s some economists argued that monetary union among the 15 EU 
member states was undesirable.
6 They based their argument on the theory of Optimal 
Currency Areas (OCAs), according to which currency unions are sustainable among 
                                                 
1 The ten are Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, the 
Slovak Republic and Slovenia, and the two are Bulgaria and Romania. Turkey is expected to start 
accession negotiations in 2004. 
2 These include: (1) adopting EC legislation on the liberalization of capital movements; (2) the 
prohibition of any public financing by the central bank and privileged access for public authorities to 
financial institutions; (3) ensuring the independence of the central bank; and (4) making price 
stability the top priority of the central bank. 
3  All twelve countries have by now closed their EMU and capital movements’ chapters in the 
accession negotiations (many were given transition periods regarding foreign purchase of real 
estate). The only exception is Romania, which is still lacking with regard to the liberalization of 
capital movements. 
4 For surveys of developments within the CEECs regarding the fulfillment of the pre-accession 
requirements and the economic convergence criteria, see Balcerowicz (2000); Commission of the 
European communities (1998, 2000); Directorate-General for Research (1999); European Central 
Bank (1999); Gros (2001); Secretariat Working Party Task Force "Enlargement" (1999). 
5  Currently, only three EU member states have a derogation and are not part of the Euro area. These 
are Denmark and the UK, which got an opt-out in the Treaty of Maastricht, and Sweden, which 
technically does not fulfill some criteria, but is mostly politically unwilling to adopt the Euro. 
6 See Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993); Bofinger (1994); De Grauwe and Vanhaverbeke (1993); 
Eichengreen and Frieden (1994); Krugman (1992).   3
major trade partners with open economies, coordinated business cycles, and similar 
rates of inflation.
7 The more the partners trade with each other, the greater the benefit 
from removing the exchange rate volatility barrier.
8 The more open an economy is to 
international trade and investments the less potent will its exchange rate be as a policy 
tool. The more the partners’ business cycles are coordinated the less will they want to 
resort to exchange rate adjustment. The higher the difference in the inflation rates 
between the partners the greater the pressure on their exchange rate.
9  
As the EMU bandwagon moved on, undeterred by foreign exchange turmoil 
and economic anti-EMU arguments, more generous judgments of EMU were made. 
Especially, some scholars argued that business cycles tend to get endogenously 
synchronized in a currency union, if enough intra-industry trade is generated among 
the members.
10 In addition, the analysis of exchange rate pegs has benefited in recent 
years from the study of domestic exchange rate politics. Scholars of domestic 
exchange rate politics hypothesize that interest groups, the political business cycle, 
the degree of stability in domestic politics in general, domestic political institutions, 
and partisanship affect exchange rates. As Bernhard, Broz and Clack (2002) and 
Hallerberg (2002) argue, a theory based purely on efficiency grounds is not a 
sufficient predictor of national exchange rate commitments.  
To test these arguments, political economists have studied the relationships 
between exchange rates and different domestic political variables, representing 
political stability, the size of various interested sectors (such as manufacturing and 
agriculture), and the political business cycle (such as the timing of elections). 
However, in spite of controlling for different economic variables these studies have 
not integrated domestic politics into a thorough OCA analysis framework, leaving out 
important OCA criteria such as business cycle correlation and intra-regional trade. In 
assessing the sustainability of an all-European currency this study will take into 
account OCA arguments as well as domestic-political ones. 
Methodologically, there are roughly three alternative approaches one could 
use to gauge the sustainability of an all-European currency union. The first, is to use 
logit, or ordered logit models, where the dependent variable is respectively, binary (to 
fix or not to fix), or ordinal (the values representing different levels in a scale of 
exchange rate commitments).
11 These models can be used to estimate the probability 
of a fix given a range of variables thought to be relevant to the decision. Thus, they 
                                                 
7 This list of OCA criteria is by no means exhaustive. Other conditions that could contribute to the 
sustainability of a currency union include high labor mobility and price flexibility among the 
partners. However, these criteria are less relevant to the political economy of the EU than those 
mentioned above. Labor mobility (Bertola, 1989; Erickson, 1995; Gros, 1996) is relatively low 
among EU member states, which are also determined to keep out CEECs’ workers, at least for a 
lengthy transition period. Price rigidities remain in many sectors in the European economy too. On 
the classic OCA theory see Gros and Thygesen (1998, 137-55); Kawai (1987); Masson and Taylor 
(1993); Tavlas (1993).  
8 The ‘New Theory of Optimum Currency Areas’ argued that fixing a weak currency to a strong 
currency also improves the credibility of disinflation policies (Tavlas, 1993). This argument was 
advanced especially with respect to the CEECs (Balcerowicz, Blaszczyk and Dabrowski, 1997). 
However, this argument is relevant only for a transition period, and only for the weak currency. 
Anyway, the popularity of this argument has been in retreat in the wake of Argentina’s recent 
economic collapse.  
9  OCA literature focuses on the nominal exchange rate rather than on the real exchange rate because it 
is interested in the efficiency of currency unions, which involve nominal commitments. 
10  See Artis and Zhang, 1995; De Grauwe and Aksoy, 1999, 13-8; and Frankel and Rose, 1998. 
11  Such studies often follow the IMF’s Exchange and Trade Restrictions. See for example Edwards, 
1996; Frieden, Ghezzi and Stein, 2001; Klein and Marion, 1997; and Savvides, 1993.   4
are especially compelling for the study of policy decisions. However, judgmental 
categorization of exchange rate arrangements conveys less information about 
underlying economic determinants than actual exchange rate behavior (Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen, 1997).
12 
Alternatively, exchange rate variation itself can be measured, and serve as an 
index that weighs and summarizes the different pressures that could destabilize a peg. 
Indeed, scholars have used different variants of Auto-Regressive Conditional 
Heteroskedasticity (ARCH) models to estimate the variance of exchange rates.
13 
While this method is especially suited for forecasting variation, it is based on long, 
high frequency time series. High frequency exchange rate variation (daily, weekly or 
monthly data) is much influenced by short-term shocks, which impede attempts to 
estimate medium- and long-term influences, such as the business cycle. In addition, 
ARCH models focus on individual currencies, rather than on a group of currencies, a 
feature that makes ARCH models a rather inadequate or cumbersome tool for the 
purpose of this study. Thus, this study uses a third alternative approach, Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen’s (1997) procedure of TSLS (Two-Step Least Squares) cross-section 
regression analysis for estimating exchange rate variation among a group of countries. 
The procedure is described in detail in Section 3.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 offers a critique of recent 
OCA studies of the sustainability of a common currency for the EU and the Central 
and Eastern European Countries (CEECs).
14 Unfortunately the domestic exchange 
rate politics literature features no studies yet of the sustainability of the Euro. Section 
3 first analyzes the performance of 26 EU member states and candidate countries 
according to exchange rate variation and each OCA criterion during 1992-1998. Then 
an OCA equation is estimated, with the volatility of exchange rates as a dependent 
variable, using a TSLS, cross-section regression analysis. Finally, the countries’ OCA 
index levels are calculated against each of the four major EU economies, assuming 
that any viable currency union would necessarily include at least one of them.  
Section 4 analyzes government instability in Europe and its determinants. It 
discusses the hypothesized relationships between this variable and exchange rate 
variation, and analyzes the performance of the sample countries. Then the volatility of 
the exchange rates is re-estimated, and the OCA index levels re-calculated. Section 5 
presents conclusions. 
  
2. A  SURVEY  OF  EXISTING  EU-CEEC  CURRENCY  AREA  STUDIES 
 
The study of the economic implications of CEEC membership of the Euro-
zone is relatively new. Observing that EU-CEEC trade is high relative to CEEC 
GDPs, and that the output composition of most candidates is only slightly different 
                                                 
12  For example, when using a logit model a country would be considered to be continuously on a peg 
even if parity realignments, or short floatation intervals take place. Similarly, a country would be 
considered to be continuously observing an exchange rate fluctuation band regardless of the extent 
of volatility within the band. More generally, in the short term a peg may disguise economic and 
political imbalances that are bound to destabilize the exchange rate at a later date. 
13  See for example Freeman, Hays and Stix, 2000; Leblang and Bernhard, 2000a; and Lobo and Tufte, 
1998. 
14 Throughout this paper the term CEEC refers for convenience to all of the twelve negotiating 
candidate countries, including Cyprus and Malta.   5
than that of non-core EU members, Kopits (1999, 6) concludes that the CEECs and 
the EU member states’ business cycles should be correlated. Therefore, the CEECs 
are expected to gain from joining the Euro area.
15  
De Grauwe and Aksoy (1999) support Kopits’ conclusions. They find that 
growth rates were similar in the EU member states and five Central European 
countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) between 1993 
and 1995, except for short-term deviations. Therefore, De Grauwe and Aksoy 
conclude that these countries enjoyed high business cycle correlation, and were closer 
to sharing an OCA with the EU than were the Scandinavian member states. However, 
De Grauwe and Aksoy leave out seven candidate countries. In addition, a three-year 
period might not be long enough to support their conclusions.  
More problematic is the methodology that both studies employ. There is no 
way to determine the relative sensitivity of exchange rate stability to the different 
OCA criteria. Thus, it is hard to assess the costs and the benefits of adopting the Euro 
by the CEECs and to weigh potentially conflicting criteria. How great would the 
effect of fixing the exchange rate be on EU-CEEC trade? The greater the effect, the 
greater is the benefit of adopting the Euro. How vulnerable to asymmetric shocks 
would fixed exchange rates be? The stability of CEECs’ membership of EMU could 
be undermined even if the EU-CEEC similarity of output composition is relatively 
high (which is debatable) if the exchange rates become highly sensitive to shocks. 
Indeed, many empirical studies have found it difficult to actually quantify and balance 
the benefits and the costs whenever fulfillment of the criteria was not vigorous. 
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997) developed a procedure for overcoming this 
problem, which is described and used in the next section. They found that the EU 
member states’ exchange rate volatility versus the DM diminished in the 1990s, and 
tended to be lower than their volatility versus the USD or Yen. However, France’s 
DM exchange rate volatility was rising. Therefore, while EMU is economically 
desirable for most EU member states, it is not economic, and therefore, politically 
motivated in the case of France. 
Since Bayoumi and Eichengreen used a fairly homogeneous sample of 21 
industrial countries, the relevance of their estimated equation to EU-CEEC economic 
relations is debatable. Bénassy-Quéré and Lahrèche-Révil  (2000) used a more 
heterogeneous sample of 49 countries (including ten CEECs) in applying the OCA 
index to analyze the rationale for de facto exchange rate regimes in the CEECs. They 
considered the behavior of the exchange rate of each country against three potential 
international anchors: the US dollar, the DM (as a pre-figuration of the Euro) and the 
yen. National OCA index values turned out lower for the CEECs against the DM than 
against the dollar or the yen. Hence, they argue, the Euro is economically better as an 
anchor currency for CEEC pegs. 
However, Bénassy-Quéré and Lahrèche-Révil's  sample is perhaps too 
heterogeneous to provide a reliable equation for the purpose of assessing the 
compatibility of the candidate countries with the Euro-zone. Moreover, Germany is 
not the sole dictator of policies in the Euro-zone, and potential pressures might arise 
from falling out of synchronization with any of the member economies.  
Another weakness in the estimations of Bayoumi and Eichengreen and of 
Bénassy-Quéré and Lahrèche-Révil  is, as in other studies surveyed above, their 
limited choice of proxy variables. While both studies account for the bilateral 
                                                 
15 On the economic benefits of EU enlargement in general, see also Baldwin, Francois and Portes 
(1997).   6
correlation of business cycles and the relative size of each country,
16 the bilateral 
difference in long-term inflation rates is neglected, as well as domestic political 
factors. Bénassy-Quéré and Lahrèche-Révil also neglect bilateral trade, preferring to 
focus on the share of intra-industry trade in bilateral trade, a factor that is already 
discounted in the cycle correlation proxy. Indeed, adjusted R
2 values for the estimated 
equations in these studies are 0.52 and lower, suggesting that some omitted factors 
account for exchange rate variability as well.  
 
3.  ESTIMATING  EUROPEAN  EXCHANGE  RATE  VARIATION 
 
This section analyzes the 14 EU member states and the twelve candidates in 
terms of basic OCA criteria.
17 The choice of the sample period – 1992-1998 – is 
constrained by the availability and the relevance of pre-1992 data for CEECs (indeed, 
some of these countries did not exist earlier), and by the availability of post-1998 data 
for EU member states (no exchange rate variability once the Euro was launched).
18 In 
order to integrate domestic politics with OCA analysis, and since business cycle and 
trade data are unavailable in higher frequency this study uses quarterly data. 
The proximity of the sample period to the launching of the single currency 
does not impair its usefulness. Arguably, certain economic variables, such as 
inflation, were the subject of government manipulation designed to fulfil the 
Maastricht criteria, but this is true for no more than the last two years of the sample. 
Exchange rates, openness and trade were beyond the legal or practical ability of 
governments to significantly manipulate. Furthermore, while the end of the 1990s saw 
relative exchange rate tranquility in the case of many of the currencies in the sample, 
the 1992-1993 period was exceptionally volatile. Therefore, the sample period seems 
balanced overall.  
Anyway, given that exchange rates cannot be manipulated in the long term 
(witness the widening of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) bands in 1993) 
whatever manipulation of the independent variables took place, the relationship 
between these variables and the exchange rate, which this paper studies, is not 
impaired.
19  
                                                 
16  Small economies are assumed to be highly open to trade.  
17  Luxembourg was not counted in the sample for lack of an independent currency and exchange rate. 
On the other hand, Austria, Finland and Sweden were counted for simplicity as EU member states 
for the entire sample period, although they became member states only in January 1995. 
18 Not all countries have complete and reliable data for all series for 1992-1998 either. Whenever 
necessary, calculations were based on shorter time spans. Unless otherwise specified, raw data was 
taken from the IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics, and International Financial Statistics. 
19 Governments are known to attempt to manipulate nominal exchange rates, and during the sample 
period the sample countries adopted a variety of exchange rate policies.  
Conventional pegged arrangements were followed by Austria until December 1994, Cyprus until 
June 1992, the Czech Republic until February 1996, Finland until September 1992, Hungary until 
March 1995, Latvia between February 1994 and 2001, Malta throughout the period, and the 
Slovak Republic until December 1995.  
Fluctuation margins were observed by Austria from January 1995, Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain throughout the period, Cyprus from June 
1992, the Czech Republic between February 1996 and May 1997, Finland from October 
1996,Greece from March 1998, Italy until September 1992 and from November 1996, the Slovak   7
3.a. Exchange rate variation 
Table 1: SDE levels for EU member states and CEECs 
FRANCE  SDE  GERMANY  SDE  ITALY  SDE  UK  SDE 
DENMARK  0.84  AUSTRIA  0.05 SLOVAK 
REPUBLIC 
4.44 MALTA  6.03
AUSTRIA  1.35  ESTONIA  0.12 SPAIN  4.57 IRELAND  6.80
GERMANY  1.36  NETHERLANDS  0.25 SWEDEN  5.02 CYPRUS  7.32
BELGIUM  1.37  BELGIUM  0.85 PORTUGAL  5.46 SWEDEN  8.98
ESTONIA  1.38  FRANCE  1.36 CZECH 
REPUBLIC 
5.49 FRANCE  8.98
NETHERLANDS  1.54  DENMARK  1.48 MALTA  5.72 FINLAND  9.11
CYPRUS  2.43  CZECH 
REPUBLIC 
2.94 GREECE  6.06 DENMARK  9.21
CZECH 
REPUBLIC 
3.32  CYPRUS  3.20 IRELAND  7.92 ITALY  9.60
IRELAND  4.23  SLOVAK 
REPUBLIC 
4.66 ESTONIA  8.55 SLOVAK 
REPUBLIC 
9.66
SLOVAK 
REPUBLIC 
4.35  IRELAND  5.12 CYPRUS  8.62 ESTONIA  9.83
MALTA  5.67  MALTA  6.34 UK  9.60 GERMANY  9.96
FINLAND  6.13  FINLAND  6.37 NETHERLANDS  10.51 AUSTRIA  9.97
PORTUGAL  6.61  PORTUGAL  6.94 FINLAND  10.65 BELGIUM  10.00
UK  8.98  SWEDEN  9.72 FRANCE  10.94 PORTUGAL  10.05
SWEDEN  9.11  UK  9.96 DENMARK  11.37 NETHERLANDS  10.18
SPAIN  10.29  SPAIN  10.52 GERMANY  11.43 CZECH 
REPUBLIC 
11.17
ITALY  10.94  LATVIA  11.23 AUSTRIA  11.44 SPAIN  12.07
LATVIA  11.06  GREECE  11.36 BELGIUM  11.44 GREECE  14.06
GREECE  11.34  ITALY  11.43 SLOVENIA  14.34 LATVIA  14.66
SLOVENIA  23.54  SLOVENIA  23.55 LATVIA  16.16 LITHUANIA  22.12
POLAND  33.07  POLAND  33.13 POLAND  23.32 SLOVENIA  22.20
HUNGARY  33.41  HUNGARY  33.28 HUNGARY  28.58 POLAND  30.44
LITHUANIA  56.89  LITHUANIA  57.25 LITHUANIA  39.84 HUNGARY  36.87
ROMANIA  132.76  ROMANIA  133.37 ROMANIA  115.41 ROMANIA  94.62
BULGARIA  138.51  BULGARIA  138.15 BULGARIA  138.65 BULGARIA  141.72
AVERAGE  20.82    20.91   21.02   21.42
EU AVERAGE  5.23    5.34   9.20   9.57
CEEC AVERAGE  37.71    37.77   33.83   34.26
Note: For each two countries SDE is the standard deviation of the bilateral exchange rate, in quarterly 
frequency, expressed in percentage points from the average exchange rate for the sample period. 
Calculations are based on IMF data. Averages are simple and not weighted. 
 
                                                                                                                                           
Republic between January 1996 and September 1998, Sweden until November 1992 and the 
United Kingdom until September 1992.  
Crawling pegs and fluctuation margins were adopted by Hungary from March 1995, and Poland 
throughout the period.  
Currency boards were adopted by Bulgaria from July 1997, Estonia throughout the period, and 
Lithuania from April 1994.  
In all other cases a free or a managed float of some sort prevailed (see International Monetary 
Fund, Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions). However, only the 
currency board arrangements ensured long-term nominal exchange rate stability effectively. As 
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997) argued the actual volatility of exchange rates is the ultimate test 
for theoretical arguments (see also footnote 12). To the extent that Estonia and Lithuania were able 
to maintain stability for so many years, this stability needs to be explained by existing theories, not 
brushed aside as an anomaly.   8
This section proceeds by first, analyzing the performance of each country in 
the sample against the four major EU economies according to exchange rate variation 
and each OCA criterion. Next, the section estimates the volatility of their exchange 
rates using a TSLS, cross-section regression analysis, and finally, calculates their 
OCA index levels against each of the four major EU economies. 
For each two countries the quarterly standard deviation of the exchange rate 
from its average for the sample period is calculated, and expressed in percentage 
points. SDE values range from a low of 0.05 percent in the German-Austrian case to a 
high of 141.72 percent in the Bulgarian-British case. Table 1 details SDE levels for all 
countries with regard to the four major EU economies, and sorts them accordingly. 
The CEECs are highlighted. 
Table 1 reveals that as far as actual exchange rate variation is concerned, 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany and the Netherlands formed a 
core with the standard deviation among them not exceeding 1.54 percent. Cyprus and 
the Czech Republic formed an outer core with 2-3 percent levels for SDE. Based on 
this performance these two countries could have joined the old ERM, has this 
arrangement continued. Ireland and the Slovak Republic formed a sort of inner 
periphery with levels of 5-6 percent. Then come Malta, Finland and Portugal with 6-7 
percent SDE levels. The next six countries, including Italy and the United Kingdom 
(UK), were either not ERM members during the sample period, had to quit it during 
that period, or had to resort to realignments to stay in it. The rest of the countries in 
Table 1 were a far cry from any peg to the core currencies, to the Italian lira, or to the 
British pound. Interestingly, all four major countries have roughly the same (simple) 
average exchange rate standard deviation with respect to the sample countries, but 
France and Germany were on average more integrated with EU member states than 
Italy and the UK.  
 
3.b. Openness 
The average ratio of total exports and imports of goods and services to GDP 
serves as a proxy for an economy’s openness. It is expressed in percentage points and 
is calculated for each economy as the average of the seven annual ratios in the 1992-
1998 period. The higher the openness the lower is exchange rate variation 
hypothesized to be. Table 2 details the openness levels for all countries, and sorts 
them accordingly. The average ratio differed significantly among European states in 
the 1990s, from a low of 42.5 in Greece’s case, to a high of 192.2 for Malta. The 
CEECs, which on average were more open than the EU member states, are 
highlighted.  
 
3.c. Bilateral trade 
Extensive trade among members of a currency area is considered an important 
OCA criterion. The more countries trade the more they would benefit from stability of 
exchange rates, and according to the endogenous OCA theory their business cycles 
would be more correlated as well. Thus, the more the partners trade the lower 
exchange rate variation is expected to be. For each pair of countries TRADE is   9
calculated as the simple average of their ratios of bilateral trade volume (exports plus 
imports) to GDP, the ratios being expressed in percentage points.
20  
 
   Table 2: Openness levels for EU member states and CEECs 
COUNTRY OPENNESS 
MALTA  192.2
ESTONIA  151.1
BELGIUM 137.3
IRELAND 134.9
SLOVAK  REPUBLIC  129.4
SLOVENIA  114.8
LATVIA  114.2
LITHUANIA  113.3
CZECH  REPUBLIC  111.9
NETHERLANDS 100.2
BULGARIA  99.6
CYPRUS  99.2
AUSTRIA 79.3
SWEDEN 71.1
HUNGARY  67.8
DENMARK 66.4
FINLAND 64.4
PORTUGAL 61.8
ROMANIA  59.8
UNITED  KINGDOM  54.5
GERMANY 49.9
POLAND  48.5
SPAIN 47.5
FRANCE 45.0
ITALY 42.7
GREECE 42.5
AVERAGE 88.4
EU  AVERAGE  71.3
CEEC  AVERAGE  108.5
Note: GDP is presented in billions of current US 
dollars, Openness in percentage points. Calculations are 
based on IMF data. Averages are simple and not 
weighted. 
 
TRADE values reach highs of 18-20 percent in obvious cases such as Italian-
Maltese, Czech-Slovak, Estonian-Finish and Irish-British trade, but in most cases are 
lower than one percent. Table 3 details TRADE levels for all countries with regard to 
the same four major EU economies. The CEECs are highlighted. Table 3 reveals that 
                                                 
20  Each bilateral trade volume and GDP are themselves averaged over the annual data for the sample 
period.   10
distinguishing core from periphery is more difficult when it comes to trade compared 
with the business cycle. Different countries concentrate their trade on different major 
economies. However, the three bottom rows in Table 3 reveal that Germany is the 
greatest trader among the major economies with an average TRADE value of 7.49 
percent. Both in Germany and in Italy’s case the average value for TRADE is higher 
with the CEECs than with the EU member states. 
 
Table 3: TRADE levels for EU member states and CEECs 
FRANCE  TRADE  GERMANY  TRADE ITALY  TRADE UK  TRADE
BELGIUM  11.98  SLOVENIA  14.77 MALTA  21.71 IRELAND  17.86
MALTA  8.24  CZECH 
REPUBLIC 
14.37 SLOVENIA  9.72  MALTA  7.86 
GERMANY  5.74  BELGIUM  13.92 GERMANY  5.07  BELGIUM  6.23 
NETHERLANDS  5.06  NETHERLANDS  12.91 FRANCE  4.22  NETHERLANDS  5.88 
SLOVENIA  4.92  AUSTRIA  12.18 ROMANIA  3.78  GERMANY  4.35 
SPAIN  4.74  SLOVAK 
REPUBLIC 
11.69 BELGIUM  3.65  FRANCE  3.67 
ITALY  4.22  HUNGARY  11.42 BULGARIA  3.43  CYPRUS  3.59 
IRELAND  4.13  POLAND  8.64  SLOVAK 
REPUBLIC 
2.94  SWEDEN  3.28 
PORTUGAL  3.71  MALTA  8.14  HUNGARY  2.91  FINLAND  2.66 
UK  3.67  LITHUANIA  7.63  NETHERLANDS  2.87  LATVIA  2.60 
SWEDEN  1.79  LATVIA  6.50  AUSTRIA  2.73  PORTUGAL  2.53 
DENMARK  1.58  IRELAND  6.33  GREECE  2.71  DENMARK  2.38 
ROMANIA  1.48  DENMARK  6.05  SPAIN  2.62  ITALY  2.22 
CZECH 
REPUBLIC 
1.47  FRANCE  5.74  CYPRUS  2.32  SPAIN  2.15 
BULGARIA  1.46  BULGARIA  5.16  UK  2.22  LITHUANIA  1.78 
HUNGARY  1.45  ITALY  5.07  PORTUGAL  2.08  ESTONIA  1.66 
AUSTRIA  1.41  ESTONIA  5.06  POLAND  2.07  CZECH 
REPUBLIC 
1.42 
SLOVAK 
REPUBLIC 
1.38  SWEDEN  4.84  CZECH 
REPUBLIC 
2.06  POLAND  1.35 
POLAND  1.36  PORTUGAL  4.73  IRELAND  1.87  SLOVENIA  1.26 
FINLAND  1.28  ROMANIA  4.41  LITHUANIA  1.39  BULGARIA  1.17 
GREECE  1.28  UK  4.35  SWEDEN  1.24  HUNGARY  1.16 
LITHUANIA  1.24  FINLAND  3.89  DENMARK  1.22  GREECE  1.03 
CYPRUS  1.24  SPAIN  3.44  ESTONIA  1.01  AUSTRIA  1.00 
LATVIA  0.84  CYPRUS  3.24  FINLAND  0.98  ROMANIA  0.79 
ESTONIA  0.74  GREECE  2.81  LATVIA  0.95  SLOVAK 
REPUBLIC 
0.72 
AVERAGE  3.06    7.49    3.51    3.22 
EU AVERAGE  3.90    6.63    2.57    4.24 
CEEC AVERAGE  2.15    8.42    4.52    2.11 
Note: For each two countries TRADE is calculated as the simple average of their ratios of bilateral 
trade volume (exports plus imports) to GDP, the ratios being expressed in percentage points. 
Calculations are based on IMF data. Averages are simple and not weighted. 
 
3.d. Business cycle correlation 
The proxy for business cycle correlation between each pair of countries is 
calculated as the standard deviation of the difference in quarterly industrial production 
growth rates during the sample period in the two countries (Bayoumi and   11
Eichengreen, 1997). Thus, CYCLE is expressed in terms of percentage points of 
growth rate. Business cycle correlation is enhanced when the two economies are 
similar in their industrial specialization and are highly integrated with each other. The 
higher CYCLE is the less correlated the business cycle is among the partners, and the 
greater the exchange rate variation is hypothesized to be.
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Table 4: CYCLE levels for EU member states and CEECs 
FRANCE  CYCLE  GERMANY  CYCLE ITALY  CYCLE UK  CYCLE
UK  1.20  FRANCE  1.30  MALTA  1.86  FRANCE  1.20 
GERMANY  1.30  SPAIN  1.55  UK  1.99  MALTA  1.31 
SPAIN  1.37  UK  1.64  GERMANY  2.06  NETHERLANDS  1.53 
MALTA  1.61  FINLAND  1.85  FRANCE  2.06  GERMANY  1.64 
FINLAND  1.63  ITALY  2.06  FINLAND  2.19  SPAIN  1.68 
NETHERLANDS  1.75  MALTA  2.12  SPAIN  2.23  FINLAND  1.69 
ITALY  2.06  NETHERLANDS  2.20  NETHERLANDS  2.37  ITALY  1.99 
GREECE  2.21  DENMARK  2.46  IRELAND  3.03  GREECE  2.19 
SWEDEN  2.29  SWEDEN  2.47  DENMARK  3.15  SWEDEN  2.26 
DENMARK  2.77  GREECE  2.59  GREECE  3.22  DENMARK  2.84 
IRELAND  3.12  IRELAND  2.80  SWEDEN  3.24  IRELAND  2.90 
PORTUGAL  3.97  PORTUGAL  4.61  AUSTRIA  4.49  PORTUGAL  4.26 
AUSTRIA  4.16  AUSTRIA  4.80  PORTUGAL  4.63  AUSTRIA  4.51 
BELGIUM  4.92  LATVIA  5.08  BELGIUM  5.37  BELGIUM  5.03 
LATVIA  5.30  BELGIUM  5.11  LATVIA  5.65  LATVIA  5.80 
SLOVENIA  6.02  SLOVENIA  5.91  SLOVENIA  5.98  SLOVENIA  6.02 
CYPRUS  6.39  CYPRUS  6.49  ROMANIA  6.01  CYPRUS  6.66 
ROMANIA  7.00  ROMANIA  6.55  SLOVAK 
REPUBLIC 
6.70  ROMANIA  6.74 
SLOVAK 
REPUBLIC 
7.02  SLOVAK 
REPUBLIC 
6.81  CYPRUS  6.94  SLOVAK 
REPUBLIC 
6.86 
HUNGARY  8.55  HUNGARY  8.34  HUNGARY  8.23  HUNGARY  8.39 
ESTONIA  9.21  ESTONIA  9.04  ESTONIA  9.11  ESTONIA  9.20 
POLAND  10.48  POLAND  10.79 POLAND  10.00 POLAND  10.16
BULGARIA  10.94  BULGARIA  10.81 BULGARIA  11.22 BULGARIA  11.08
LITHUANIA  11.95  LITHUANIA  11.66 CZECH 
REPUBLIC 
11.59 CZECH 
REPUBLIC 
11.95
CZECH 
REPUBLIC 
12.13  CZECH 
REPUBLIC 
11.69 LITHUANIA  11.88 LITHUANIA  12.11
AVERAGE  5.17    5.23    5.41    5.20 
EU AVERAGE  2.51    2.73    3.08    2.59 
CEEC AVERAGE  8.05    7.94    7.93    8.02 
Note: CYCLE is the standard deviation of the difference in quarterly, industrial production growth 
rates in each two countries. Thus, CYCLE is expressed in terms of percentage points of growth rate. 
Calculations are based on IMF data. Averages are simple and not weighted. 
 
CYCLE values range from a low of 1.20 percent in the French-British case to 
a high of 18.32 percent in the Bulgarian-Lithuanian case. Table 4 details CYCLE 
levels for all countries with regard to the four major EU economies, and sorts them 
                                                 
21 Industrial production is inferior to GDP as a measure of the business cycle, but was nevertheless 
preferred because quarterly real GDP series were either unavailable or incomplete for many of the 
countries in the sample.   12
accordingly. The CEECs are highlighted. Table 4 reveals that as far as business cycle 
correlation is concerned, the six major EU economies, as well as Finland and 
(surprisingly) Malta form a core with the difference in quarterly industrial production 
growth rates among them varying by no more than 2.37 percent (rows 1-7 in all 
columns). The second group of countries, occupying rows 8-11 in all columns, 
consists of Denmark, Greece, Ireland and Sweden, with CYCLE levels of 2.19-3.24. 
The ranking of the rest of the countries is no surprise, except for Austria, Belgium, 
and the Czech Republic. The three bottom rows in Table 4 show that the simple 
average of CYCLE values for all four major countries are almost identical. In 
addition, most of the EU member states seem economically well integrated, in 
contrast to the CEECs. 
 
3.e. Inflation 
The higher the inflation gap between the partners the greater the exchange rate 
variation is hypothesized to be. The average annual rate of consumer price inflation 
differed significantly among European states in the 1990s, from a low of 1.4 in 
Finland’s case, to a high of 221.4 for Bulgaria. Table 5 details INFLATION levels for 
all countries in the sample. The CEECs are highlighted. It comes as no surprise that 
the EU member states formed a core, although, Malta, Cyprus and the Czech Republic 
did better than Greece.  
 
3.f. Estimating a standard OCA equation 
Section 2 described the problem of estimating the relative importance of the 
different OCA criteria. This problem can be overcome using Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen’s (1997) method, which operationalizes OCA theory and enables to 
quantify and to scale the readiness of the CEECs to join the Euro area. Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen’s (1997) procedure uses TSLS cross-section regression analysis to 
estimate an equation where the independent variables are proxies for different OCA 
criteria, and the dependent variable is a measure of exchange rate volatility. Each 
observation in the data relates to a certain pair of countries from a sample group of 
countries, and consists of proxy values calculated for these countries over the sample 
period.  
The first step in any TSLS procedure is to clear two-way relationships among 
the independent variables in the equation under examination (the OCA equation in 
this study), and between them and the dependent variable. For each one of these 
independent variables an instrument equation is estimated, with that variable as the 
dependent variable and a few independent variables called the instrument variables. It 
is important that different and non-correlated instrument variables are used in the 
instrument equations.  
The second step in a TSLS procedure is to calculate the instrumented values of 
the independent variables in the examined (OCA) equation. This is done in each 
observation for each independent variable by substituting the values of the instrument 
variables in the instrument equations. Then the instrumented values of the 
independent variables can be used to estimate the examined (OCA) equation. This 
completes the TSLS procedure.   13
   Table 5: Inflation levels for EU member  
        states and CEECs 
COUNTRY INFLATION 
FINLAND 1.4 
FRANCE 1.7 
SWEDEN 1.8 
DENMARK 1.9 
BELGIUM 2.0 
IRELAND 2.1 
AUSTRIA 2.4 
NETHERLANDS 2.4 
GERMANY 2.6 
UNITED  KINGDOM  2.9 
MALTA  3.1 
ITALY 3.8 
CYPRUS  3.9 
SPAIN 3.9 
PORTUGAL 4.7 
CZECH  REPUBLIC  9.4 
GREECE 9.8 
SLOVAK  REPUBLIC  10.7 
HUNGARY  21.2 
POLAND  27.1 
ESTONIA  34.7 
SLOVENIA  35.5 
LATVIA  63.4 
LITHUANIA  93.4 
ROMANIA  126.9 
BULGARIA  221.4 
AVERAGE 26.7
EU  AVERAGE  1.3
CEEC  AVERAGE  54.2
Note: INFLATION, in percentage points, is the 
average annual rate of consumer price inflation for 
the sample period, based on IMF data. Averages are 
simple and not weighted. 
 
According to the Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997) procedure, once the OCA 
equation is estimated, the instrumented values of the independent variables are 
substituted in it to find the implied exchange rate volatility among any two countries 
or currency blocs. The implied exchange rate volatility is called the OCA index. The 
higher it is, the more difficult it would be for the two countries concerned to form a 
currency union.  
Thus, as a first step in the TSLS procedure, TRADE, CYCLE and 
INFLATION are instrumented. All instrument equations, as well as the OCA equation 
are estimated over 325 observations, each observation relating to a single pair of   14
countries out of the 26 countries in the sample. Unless otherwise specified, all 
coefficients turned out significant at levels below five percent.  
The bilateral trade volume is estimated using the following instrument 
equation (corrected for heteroskedasticity, standard errors in parentheses): 
 
(1) TURNOVER = 3293 + 12.41*GDPij – 64.98* POPij – 3.344*DISTANCE 
          (1132)  (2.706)          (36.97)
*           (0.691)   
Adjusted R
2:  0.45       S. E: 8747     
This is a basic gravity equation with classic results. TURNOVER is the 
bilateral trade turnover, the sum of average annual exports and average annual 
imports for the sample period between the two countries in millions of current US 
dollars. GDPij is the sum of the nominal GDPs of the two countries (annual averages 
for the sample period) in billions of US dollars. Its coefficient means that the marginal 
propensity to trade is roughly twelve million dollars worth of trade for every one 
billion dollars worth of GDP. Trade grows with the size of the economy. POPij is the 
sum of the populations of the two countries in millions. Trade declines by more than 
three million dollars for every one million people in population. Populous countries 
are classically hypothesized to be less trade oriented because of the presumption that 
they enjoy both economics of scale and a variety of specialized skills. DISTANCE is 
the distance between the capitals of two states in kilometers. As a natural trade barrier 
it is expected to have a negative coefficient. Trade decreases by 3.3 million dollars for 
every one kilometer of distance between the partners.  
CYCLE is estimated using the following instrument equation (corrected for 
heteroskedasticity, standard errors in parentheses): 
 
(2) CYCLE = 8.531 – 0.009* insTRADE – 0.053*EUinsTRADE  
         (0.288)  (0.004)                (0.025)         
+ 0.024*CANinsTRADE – 5.005*EU + 1.399*CANDIDATE  
  (0.011)           (0.361)      (0.555) 
Adjusted R
2:  0.46    S. E: 2.715     
InsTRADE is the instrumented ratio of bilateral exports and imports of goods 
relative to GDP. In each observation, the instrumented value of TURNOVER (the 
actual value of TURNOVER minus the error term for that observation) is divided 
separately by each of the two countries’ GDPs and the two ratios are averaged to yield 
insTRADE. EUinsTRADE is a slope dummy, the product of insTRADE and EU, 
where EU = 1 for 91 observations in which both countries are EU member states, 0 
otherwise. CANinsTRADE is a slope dummy, the product of insTRADE and 
CANDIDATE, where CANDIDATE = 1 for 66 observations in which both countries 
are candidate countries, 0 otherwise.  
The specification of Equation (2) follows the argument of the endogenous 
OCA theory and the results seem to vindicate it. The more countries trade, the greater 
is their business cycle correlation. This is especially true for trade among EU member 
states (EUinsTRADE has a negative coefficient), which is mostly intra-industrial. 
However, among the candidate countries trade tends to hamper business cycle 
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correlation (the sum of the coefficients of insTRADE and CANinsTRADE is 
positive), presumably due to greater inter-industry trade, which characterizes 
periphery countries.  
The intercept dummy variables (EU and CANDIDATE) are meant to capture 
differences in the level of cycle correlation due to policy coordination. Indeed, the 
results show that business cycles were more synchronized among the EU member 
states in the 1990s than among the candidate countries even after controlling for trade. 
For the purpose of regression analysis INFLATION is calculated in each 
observation as the absolute difference between the average annual rates of inflation in 
the two countries. INFLATION is estimated using the following instrument equation 
(standard errors in parentheses): 
 
(3) INFLATION = 14.88 + 1.366*INTEREST  
      (1.498)  (0.035)                
Adjusted R
2:  0.83  S. E: 24.31         
INTEREST is the absolute difference between national real interest rates, 
expressed in percentage points. For each country the average rate for the sample 
period of the major monetary policy instrument is used. Thus, INTEREST represents 
long-term convergence of national monetary policies. According to standard monetary 
theory real interest rates should be negatively correlated with inflation. Thus, the 
lower is the difference between a pair of countries’ interest rates, the lower is the 
difference expected to be between their rates of inflation. Equation (3) supports this 
expectation. 
It is assumed here that policy instruments are exogenous variables. While 
some data suggests that central banks follow pre-determined rules in their policy 
decisions, possibly endogenizing their instruments, none are legally or politically 
committed to any rule, and all maintain enough room for discretion (Judd and 
Rudebusch, 1998; and Taylor, 1993). Of course, between 1983 and 1992 a minority of 
the sample countries were members of the ERM and adjusted their interest rates to 
accord with their exchange rate commitment. However, that rule was broken during 
the sample period, when significant realignment followed and the fluctuation margins 
were widened.  
As a second step in the TSLS procedure, Equation (4) is estimated, based on 
the instrumented variables and on OPENNESS, which is not instrumented as it is not 
suspected of being influenced by the other variables in the equation. OPENNESS is 
calculated for the purpose of regression analysis in each observation as the simple 
average of the two economies’ openness ratios (corrected for heteroskedasticity, 
standard errors in parentheses, ins prefix denoting instrumented values):
22 
 
(4) SDE = 5.925 – 0.319*OPENNESS + 3.769*insCYCLE + 0.614*insINFLATION 
      (2.724)   (0.045)        (0.369)               (0.027) 
Adjusted R
2:  0.78     S. E: 19.20     
According to Equation (4) a rise of one percentage point in exports and 
imports relative to GDP reduced exchange rate volatility in the 1992-1998 period by 
almost 0.3 percentage points. A rise of one percentage point in the standard deviation 
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of the difference in the partners’ industrial growth rates raised exchange rate variation 
by 3.7 percentage points. A rise of one percentage point in the long-term inflation 
differential raised exchange rate variation by 0.6 percentage points. The signs of all 
coefficients are as hypothesized. 
 
3.g. Calculating the OCA index 
Table 6: OCA index levels for EU member states and CEECs for 1995-2001 
FRANCE OCA 
index 
GERMANY OCA 
index 
ITALY OCA 
index 
UK OCA 
index 
IRELAND  -6.98  IRELAND  -8.58  IRELAND  -5.59 IRELAND  -7.61
BELGIUM  -3.73  BELGIUM  -5.95  BELGIUM  -3.01 BELGIUM  -4.29
NETHERLANDS  3.35  MALTA  -0.98  NETHERLANDS  3.94 NETHERLANDS  2.74
MALTA  4.00  NETHERLANDS  1.24  MALTA  4.41 MALTA  4.46
AUSTRIA  5.89  AUSTRIA  3.55  AUSTRIA  6.41 AUSTRIA  5.37
SWEDEN  7.51  SWEDEN  5.21  SWEDEN  8.16 SWEDEN  6.92
PORTUGAL  8.19  DENMARK  6.31  FINLAND  8.80 FINLAND  7.45
FINLAND  8.21  FINLAND  6.71  PORTUGAL  9.13 PORTUGAL  7.75
DENMARK  8.77  PORTUGAL  6.75  DENMARK  9.52 DENMARK  8.21
SPAIN  11.21  SPAIN  10.15  UK  11.31 SPAIN  10.63
GERMANY  11.41  UK  10.79  SPAIN  11.69 GERMANY  10.79
UK  11.58  FRANCE  11.41  GERMANY  11.80 ITALY  11.31
ITALY  12.57  ITALY  11.80  FRANCE  12.57 FRANCE  11.58
GREECE  15.65  ESTONIA  12.08  GREECE  15.37 GREECE  14.21
ESTONIA  16.85  GREECE  14.18  ESTONIA  18.70 ESTONIA  16.54
SLOVAK 
REPUBLIC 
18.23  SLOVAK 
REPUBLIC 
15.66  SLOVAK 
REPUBLIC 
18.83 SLOVAK 
REPUBLIC 
17.76
CZECH 
REPUBLIC 
19.83  CZECH 
REPUBLIC 
17.70  CZECH 
REPUBLIC 
20.33 CZECH 
REPUBLIC 
19.26
SLOVENIA  22.04  LATVIA  18.54  SLOVENIA  22.56 SLOVENIA  21.61
LATVIA  22.65  SLOVENIA  19.49  CYPRUS  23.33 CYPRUS  22.27
LITHUANIA  23.49  LITHUANIA  20.18  LATVIA  24.12 LATVIA  22.32
CYPRUS  23.54  CYPRUS  21.37 LITHUANIA  24.46 LITHUANIA  23.07
HUNGARY  27.63  HUNGARY  25.99  HUNGARY  28.13 HUNGARY  27.07
POLAND  34.12  POLAND  33.30  POLAND  33.88 POLAND  32.46
ROMANIA  46.62  ROMANIA  44.37  ROMANIA  47.05 ROMANIA  46.08
BULGARIA  133.41  BULGARIA  130.44  BULGARIA  133.90 BULGARIA  133.07
AVERAGE  19.53    17.36    20.08   20.17 
EU AVERAGE  6.69    5.25    7.15   8.22 
CEEC AVERAGE  32.89    30.03    33.49   32.43 
Note: For each country the index is the 1995-2001 forecast of the quarterly standard deviation of the 
exchange rate expressed in percentage points from an average exchange rate. Averages at the bottom 
rows are simple and not weighted.
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Equations (1)-(4) can now be used to calculate the OCA index between any 
pair of countries by substituting the relevant bilateral data in the equations. This index 
is a forecast of the quarterly standard deviation of the exchange rate from an average 
exchange rate, in percentage points. Table 6 lists the index values for all countries 
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with regard to the four major EU countries based on data for 1995-2001, which is the 
most recent available data for the entire group of countries. The bottom rows calculate 
simple averages for each major economy. The CEECs are highlighted. 
 
Table 7: OCA index levels for EU member states and CEECs for 1992-1998 
FRANCE OCA 
index 
GERMANY OCA 
index 
ITALY OCA 
index 
UK OCA 
index 
IRELAND  -1.71  BELGIUM  -2.36  IRELAND  -0.65  IRELAND  -2.76 
BELGIUM  -0.66  IRELAND  -2.19  BELGIUM  0.64  BELGIUM  -2.13 
MALTA  4.44  MALTA  -1.32  MALTA  5.43  NETHERLANDS  4.27 
NETHERLANDS  5.78  NETHERLANDS  3.67  NETHERLANDS  7.00  MALTA  5.16 
AUSTRIA  9.05  AUSTRIA  6.32  AUSTRIA  10.17  SWEDEN  7.67 
SWEDEN  9.09  SWEDEN  9.28  SWEDEN  10.31  AUSTRIA  7.67 
DENMARK  9.51  DENMARK  9.44  FINLAND  10.77  DENMARK  8.12 
FINLAND  9.94  FINLAND  9.79  DENMARK  10.88  FINLAND  8.84 
PORTUGAL  11.35  PORTUGAL  11.37  PORTUGAL  11.73  PORTUGAL  10.39 
UK  12.20  UK  12.70  UK  13.17  SPAIN  12.19 
SPAIN  13.53  SPAIN  14.21  SPAIN  13.73  FRANCE  12.20 
GERMANY  14.34  FRANCE  14.34  FRANCE  14.56  GERMANY  12.70 
ITALY  14.56  ITALY  15.31  GERMANY  15.31  ITALY  13.17 
GREECE  16.99  GREECE  16.89  GREECE  16.73  GREECE  16.03 
SLOVAK 
REPUBLIC 
22.07  SLOVAK 
REPUBLIC 
18.81  SLOVAK 
REPUBLIC 
23.30  SLOVAK 
REPUBLIC 
20.84 
CZECH 
REPUBLIC 
23.10  LATVIA  19.35  CZECH 
REPUBLIC 
24.18  CZECH 
REPUBLIC 
21.60 
CYPRUS  23.44  SLOVENIA  20.54  CYPRUS  24.49  CYPRUS  22.68 
SLOVENIA  23.86  CZECH 
REPUBLIC 
20.90  SLOVENIA  25.02  SLOVENIA  22.74 
LATVIA  25.35  CYPRUS  21.09  LATVIA  27.95  LATVIA  24.97 
LITHUANIA  26.96  LITHUANIA  22.12  LITHUANIA  28.82  LITHUANIA  26.16 
ESTONIA  29.25  ESTONIA  22.68  HUNGARY  31.91  ESTONIA  28.94 
HUNGARY  30.80  HUNGARY  28.07  ESTONIA  32.15  HUNGARY  29.32 
POLAND  35.84  POLAND  33.30  POLAND  36.86  POLAND  34.27 
ROMANIA  71.06  ROMANIA  68.20  ROMANIA  72.10  ROMANIA  69.67 
BULGARIA  149.25  BULGARIA  145.53  BULGARIA  150.35  BULGARIA  148.28 
AVERAGE  23.58    21.52   24.68   22.52 
EU AVERAGE  9.54    9.14   10.34   8.34 
CEEC AVERAGE  38.79    34.94   40.21   37.89 
Note: For each country the index is the 1995-2001 forecast of the quarterly standard deviation of the 
exchange rate expressed in percentage points from an average exchange rate. Averages at the bottom 
rows are simple and not weighted.
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The three bottom rows reveal that Germany is the core of entire group of EU 
member states and CEECs, with an average OCA index of 17.4 percent compared 
with roughly 20 percent for the other three major countries. This reflects Germany’s 
lead in economic integration with EU member states as well as with CEECs. 
Unsurprisingly, the EU member states feature lower OCA index values than the 
CEECs. The exceptions are Malta and Estonia, which is more integrated with 
Germany than Greece is. Ireland and Belgium could fit in any European currency 
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union, and the Netherlands, Malta, Austria and Sweden get good scores too. However, 
the four majors are generally less suitable as currency partners than the smaller 
member states.  
For the 1992-1998 period all four major economies come out with higher 
average OCA index levels than in the later period (see Table 7). This means that in 
the 1990s Europe has progressed on its path to becoming an OCA. However, progress 
was slow.  Even more interesting is the difference between the two periods in EU 
average OCA index levels. In the 1992-1998 period the UK lead with an 8.3 percent 
average index, followed by Germany with 9.1 percent index value, France coming out 
only third – 9.5, and Italy last – 10.3. The UK was the only one among the four 
majors to stagnate in its integration with the EU member states, and Germany was the 
most successful in integration. In other words, during the 1990s the UK has moved 
away in relative terms from the core of the EU.  
All of the other countries made progress in their economic integration with the 
four majors, except for slight reversals in the cases of Cyprus with France and 
Germany, and Denmark with the United Kingdom. Malta, Slovenia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Hungary and Poland progressed rather slowly, Estonia and Romania quite rapidly. 
This integration process was driven mainly by an increase in openness of all but 
Malta, Latvia and Lithuania, and by real interest rate convergence of most with each 
of the four majors. The only cases of greater real interest rate divergence are Cyprus 
and Denmark with France, Cyprus and Poland with Germany, and Denmark and 
Sweden with the United Kingdom. 
In order to move from merely ranking the countries according to their fitness 
to join the Euro-zone, into actually identifying the countries that could form a 
sustainable currency union among them, it is important to interpret correctly the index 
values. One way to interpret the index levels is to assume that the 28 quarterly 
exchange rate observations in the sample for each pair of currencies are distributed 
uniformly around their average value.  
According to this interpretation, the standard deviation of the exchange rate 
represents half of the distance between the average exchange rate for the seven-year 
period, and either of the two extreme values. Thus, the index value for each pair of 
currencies represents one quarter of the entire width of the band within which their 
potential exchange rate varies. The potential average annual depreciation rate of the 
weak currency of the two in percentage points of the average exchange rate for the 
period cannot exceed 4/7 of the index value.  
Another way to interpret the index levels is to assume that exchange rates 
distribute normally during the seven-year period, around their average values. In this 
case, the standard deviation of the exchange rate represents one third of the distance 
between the average exchange rate for the seven-year period, and either of the two 
extreme values.
25 Thus, the index value for each pair of currencies represents one 
sixth of the entire width of the band within which their potential exchange rate varies. 
The potential average annual depreciation rate of the weak currency in percentage 
points of the average exchange rate for the period cannot exceed 6/7 of the index 
value. The potential annual depreciation rate can be interpreted as the potential rate of 
loss in competitiveness in case a union is formed between the two currencies, 
depressing the local industry. 
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The Maastricht treaty demands that a member-state would keep its currency 
within ±2.25 percent exchange rate fluctuation band against the nominal anchor for 
two years prior to joining the Euro-zone. This means an average annual depreciation 
rate of the weak currency of at most 2.25 percentage points.
26 Taking the Maastricht 
exchange rate criterion as a benchmark, only countries with an OCA index value of 
less than 3.94 percentage points can join the Euro-zone under the uniform exchange 
rate distribution assumption, or 2.63 percentage points under the normal distribution 
assumption.
27 According to Table 6 and the normal distribution assumption, each of 
the four major EU economies could form a currency union with Ireland and 
Belgium.
28 The Netherlands could fit a currency union with the UK or Germany, and 
Malta could only link with Germany. Under the uniform distribution assumption, 
France could also allow the Netherlands and Malta in, Germany could form a six-
country currency union including Austria, and Italy could link up with the 
Netherlands.
29 
The CEECs are a long way from the level of economic integration with the EU 
member states that can sustain a currency union with them, in spite of the progress 
achieved. However, according to Equations (2) and (4) after joining the EU the 
CEECs OCA index levels should come down significantly.
30  
Estonia maintained a currency board with the DM throughout the sample 
period (see Table 1), but Table 6 shows Estonia’s OCA index levels to be high (6.9 
percent annual implied depreciation rate against Germany under the uniform 
distribution assumption). This points to the pressures and adjustments that the 
Estonian economy has to bear for the sake of the currency board. The figures in Table 
6 also cast a shadow over Bulgaria’s current currency board. On the other hand, 
Lithuania’s currency board with the US dollar brought it twice as much exchange rate 
variation with the German Mark than should have been according to economic 
variables. 
As for EU member states, as already noted Table 6 points to insufficient 
integration among the four major economies. OCA index values of 10.8-12.6 between 
the four majors are far from the zero exchange-rate fluctuation margin implied by 
EMU, or the 3.94 benchmark value derived out of the Maastricht criterion. Greece 
does even worse with values in the range of 14.2-15.7. These high OCA index values 
reflect the vulnerability of the euro-zone in hard times. While the CEECs may now be 
more integrated with the EU then they were a decade ago, the lack of sufficient 
integration among EU member states is alarming and has the potential to significantly 
destabilize EMU. 
 
                                                 
26  (2 sides of the band)*(2.25 percent)/(2 years). 
27  2.25*(7 years)/(4 standard deviations) and 2.25*(7 years)/(6 standard deviations) respectively. 
28  Obviously, the standard deviation of the exchange rate cannot be negative. The negative values for 
Ireland and Belgium are a product of extreme figures and coefficients that are linear approximations 
of relationships that may not be perfectly linear. 
29  Of course, the exchange rates can have different distributions. The uniform and the normal 
distributions were chosen for simplicity.  
30 The product of the coefficients of insCYCLE in Equation (4) and EU in Equation (2) is –18.86, and 
this is exclusive of the effect of EUinsTRADE. While expecting the index levels to come down by 
that much would be a naive way of applying linearly approximated equations, the basic logic holds.   20
4.  GOVERNMENT  STABILITY  AND  EXCHANGE  RATE  VARIATION 
 
This section discusses the hypothesized relationships between government 
stability and exchange rate variation, and analyzes the performance of the sample 
countries according to variables hypothesized to influence government stability. Next, 
government stability is instrumented with these variables, and then the volatility of 
the exchange rates is re-estimated, and the OCA index levels re-calculated. 
 
4.a. Cabinet reshuffles 
Scholars of domestic exchange rate politics have used a number of operational 
indicators of government stability. For example, Beck, et. al. (2001) measure 
government stability by the extent of turnover of a government’s key decision-maker 
in any given year.
31 However, since many of the countries in this study’s sample are 
stable democracies and the sample period rather short relative to political cycles, 
government turnover would not feature sufficient variation. In addition, as Bernhard 
and Leblang (2002b) note, variation in the length of constitutionally mandated 
electoral terms rule out defining government stability in terms of the number of the 
months that a cabinet is in office.
32 Blomberg and Hess (1997) and Freeman, Hays 
and Stix (2000) prefer measuring the stability of governments by the approval ratings 
of the top executive. However, detailed and frequent approval data is available only 
for a limited number of countries. 
This study uses the frequency of cabinet reshuffles as an indicator of 
government stability. Portfolio changes are associated with reduced stability because 
they shorten the horizon in office of individual decision makers, and because they 
disrupt the orderly functioning of the government. Politicians being reluctant to give 
up office, portfolio changes are also often the result of changes in the standing of the 
top executive, and/or adjustments in the balance of power among the coalition parties 
and factions. The more reshuffles take place, the lower the stability. All this is true for 
parliamentary as well as for European presidential systems.  
The cabinet reshuffles’ frequency is somewhat similar to the government 
crises’ count used by Broz (2002), but enjoys two major advantages. First, reshuffles 
are counted even when they do not threaten to bring the downfall of the government, 
thus providing this variable with greater variation than the number of crises. Second, 
by counting reshuffles the often-subjective interpretation of whether a situation is a 
crisis is avoided. 
For the purpose of this study cabinet reshuffles are defined as events in which 
any change in government portfolio allocation occurred (including resignations) that 
is not related to an election brought about by the conclusion of a constitutionally 
mandated term of office. Thus, changes of government as a result of early elections 
                                                 
31 A similar approach is taken by Edwards, 1996; Frieden, Ghezzi and Stein, 2001; and Klein and 
Marion, 1997. 
32 They use in stead the ratio of the actual term of cabinet to the maximum term available when the 
cabinet takes office. However, this does not overcome the problem of constitutional variations. For 
example, a cabinet that serves a full five year mandated term would score the same as a cabinet that 
serves a full four year mandated term, although staying in office longer is trickier.   21
are counted as cabinet reshuffles. Whenever several portfolio changes occurred within 
one quarter, all changes are regarded as one event. 
 
Table 8: Number of cabinet reshuffles during 
1992-1998 in EU member states and CEECs 
COUNTRY Number  of 
cabinet reshuffles 
NETHERLANDS 0
CYPRUS  1
CZECH REPUBLIC  1
FINLAND 1
MALTA  1
BULGARIA  2
DENMARK 2
GERMANY 2
LITHUANIA  2
SWEDEN 2
UK 2
ESTONIA  3
FRANCE 3
IRELAND 3
POLAND  3
SLOVENIA  3
SPAIN 3
AUSTRIA 4
BELGIUM 4
HUNGARY  4
ITALY 4
PORTUGAL 4
ROMANIA  5
GREECE 6
LATVIA  6
SLOVAK REPUBLIC  6
AVERAGE 2.96
EU  AVERAGE  2.86
CEEC  AVERAGE  3.08
Note: Cabinet reshuffles are defined as events in 
which any change in government portfolio allocation 
occurred (including resignations) that is not related to 
an election brought about by the conclusion of a 
constitutionally mandated term of office. Averages 
are simple and not weighted. Source: Keesing Record 
of World Events. 
 
Table 8 details the number of cabinet reshuffles in the 26 countries in the 
sample during 1992-1998. The CEECs are highlighted. The Netherlands stands out   22
with no cabinet reshuffles, while Greece, Latvia, and the Slovak Republic feature the 
least stable governments with six reshuffles each. The CEECs were just a little less 
stable than the EU member states with an average of 3.08 reshuffles, compared with 
2.86 for the member states. 
How is government instability related to exchange rates? Scholars of domestic 
exchange rate politics generally agree that government instability is associated with 
greater exchange rate variation. However, causality can run both ways. One group of 
empirical studies emphasizes how fixed exchange rates cause political stability, 
serving as focal points for policy agreement and bargaining, and helping politicians 
manage intra-party and intra-coalition conflicts (Bernhard and Leblang, 1999; and 
2002b). This is especially so in highly open economies where the political weight of 
capital owners is enhanced and the effectiveness of policy on real variables is 
diminished. Similarly, Frieden (2002) argues that unstable governments tend to seek 
credibility through an exchange rate peg.
33 Hallerberg (2002, 791) makes a related 
argument, namely that office-seeking veto players in a multi-party government 
coalition may give up monetary autonomy because it is hard for each of them to target 
the benefits of monetary policy directly to their constituencies.  
Another, rather larger group of empirical studies reverse the direction of 
causality, and find that stable governments are more likely do fix exchange rates, 
because sustaining a fixed exchange rate may require politically difficult adjustments 
(Frieden, Ghezzi and Stein, 2001). Decision makers with short horizons in office 
would be more opportunistic and less inclined to follow policies that are painful or 
unpopular in the short-term. Thus, unstable governments are hypothesized to increase 
exchange rate volatility both because they increase political and economic 
uncertainty, and because their members would not chose to peg the currency to an 
external anchor. A long list of studies supports this argument for industrial as well as 
developing countries, and over a variety of sample periods.
34 Since this study is 
interested in exogenous determinants of exchange rate variation, this second approach 
is adopted.  
 
4.b. Determinants of government instability  
Political scientists argue that the majority status of the government and the 
number of parties in it affect government stability.
35 Stable governments are 
associated with the existence of a dominant party in the coalition, especially a single-
party majority government, and a strong majority for the coalition in parliament 
(Laver and Schofield, 1990; and Lijphart, 1999). Thus, Bernhard and Leblang (2002b) 
use dummy variables for single-party majority governments, minimum-winning 
coalitions, and minority governments to study the relationship between government 
stability and exchange rate variation. Other scholars use the combined share of the 
ruling coalition’s seats in parliament.
36 The extent of fragmentation of the coalition 
                                                 
33 Frieden argues for a negative relationship between exchange rate variation and government 
instability, but admits this argument is hard to support empirically (see pages 852-4). Indeed, had 
such a negative relationship been found in his twenty-year sample period it would have raised a 
puzzle: If over such a long period fixed exchange rates are associated with unstable governments, 
how does a fix provide credibility and stability? 
34 See Bernhard and Leblang, 2002a; Edwards, 1996; Freeman, Hays and Stix, 2000; Keefer and 
Stasavage, 2002; Klein and Marion, 1997; Leblang and Bernhard, 2000b; and Simmons, 1994. 
35 Alt and King, 1994; King, Alt, Burns and Laver, 1990; and Warwick, 1994. 
36 See Edwards, 1996; Frieden, 2002; and Frieden, Ghezzi and Stein (2001).   23
also affects its stability. Some scholars use the number of coalition parties as a 
measure of fragmentation.
37 
The Difficulty for the purpose of this study for the use of similar variables to 
explain cabinet reshuffles, and then exchange rate variation, is that coalition variables 
can be endogenous to exchange rates, as explained above, and in some cases even to 
cabinet reshuffles. The very decision of a party to join a coalition could be sensitive to 
both the degree of exchange rate stability and the level of legislature fragmentation. 
Any party in the legislature could be a potential veto player, and may figure in the top 
executive’s calculations, even when it is in opposition.
38 Since this study is interested 
in the causes of exchange rate stability, rather than its effects, it is imperative to use 
variables that are exogenous to exchange rate variation. 
For this reason, this study uses MAJORPARTY, the share in percentage points 
of the major party’s seats in parliament, as a proxy for the strength of the governing 
coalition.
39 This is not a perfect variable either because sometimes the major party is 
not a member of the governing coalition, but such cases are rare. MAJORPARTY is 
hypothesized to be negatively correlated with cabinet reshuffles. In addition, the 
number of parties in parliament, labeled PARLNUMPARTY, is used as a proxy for 
potential coalition fragmentation.
40 This is also the choice of Bernhard and Leblang 
(2002b) and Frieden, Ghezzi and Stein (2001).
41 The greater is PARLNUMPARTY 
the less stable is the government hypothesized to be. 
Cabinet reshuffles are presumed to have a different meaning under a 
presidential system, compared with a parliamentary one. On the one hand, in 
presidential systems the struggle to form and maintain a diverse coalition is of a lower 
intensity than in parliamentary systems because it is not a struggle for the top 
executive office. On the other hand, coalition politics do matter in European 
presidential systems because the president has to either appoint a prime minister that 
can form a governing coalition in parliament, or otherwise cohabit with a majority in 
parliament that is not always to her liking. Thus, the president is often forced to 
compromise over appointments and policies. The net effect is that presidential 
systems are hypothesized to feature fewer cabinet reshuffles than parliamentary 
systems. Therefore, a proper estimation of the effects of MAJORPARTY and 
PARLNUMPARTY on cabinet reshuffles requires controlling for the existence of a 
presidential system.  
PRESIDENT is a variable that scores 1 for presidential democracies, 0 for 
parliamentary ones. Following Beck, et. al. (2001) the decision whether to call the 
system presidential or parliamentary, whenever both a president and a prime minister 
exist, is based on the power that the two have relative to each other. Countries in 
                                                 
37 See Frieden, 2002; Keefer, 2002; and Keefer and Stasavage, 2002, 762-3. 
38  For example, a prime minister presiding over a weak government with many cabinet reshuffles may 
wish to enlarge the coalition to stabilize it. An opposition party may or may not decide to join the 
coalition based on the prospects of the coalition given political fragmentation. 
39 Unless otherwise specified, all variables presented in this subsection are calculated based on data 
from Keesing’s Record of World Events and from the Stateman’s Yearbook. The value for each 
country is an average of quarterly data for the sample period. In bicameral systems the values are 
based on the lower chamber.  
40  See footnote 39. Every faction that had its own allocation of seats in parliament is counted as a 
distinct party, even if it ran to parliament together with an alignment of factions. Accordingly, 
independent members of parliament are each counted as one party.  
41 Beck, et. al. (2001) argue that the fragmentation level of the entire legislative could be misleading as 
a measure of coalition fragmentation because of the low correlation between coalition and 
opposition fragmentation levels. However, this may be true only if one takes the affiliation of 
political parties to either coalition or opposition as exogenous.   24
which the president is constitutionally defined as the top executive, or has the power 
to appoint and dismiss the cabinet are considered presidential.  
 
Table 9: Determinants of government instability during 
1992-1998 in EU member states and CEECs 
COUNTRY  MAJORPARTY PARL 
NUMPARTY 
PRESIDENT TURNOUT  CORRUPTION 
AUSTRIA  40.3 4.6 0 83.3 7.3
BELGIUM  18.9 11.9 0 91.7  6.1
BULGARIA  50.9 4.2 1 74.5 2.9
CYPRUS  35.7 4.4 1 92.9 4.5
CZECH 
REPUBLIC 
37.7 7.4 0 81.8 4.8
DENMARK  36.1 12.8 0 84.4  9.7
ESTONIA  36.0 7.8 0 68.5 5.7
FINLAND  29.8 9.6 0 71.9 9.4
FRANCE  42.7 27.3 1 68.2  6.9
GERMANY  39.2 6.0 0 78.8 8.0
GREECE  54.0 5.9 0 77.7 4.5
HUNGARY  48.7 10.8 0 66.3  4.6
IRELAND  42.9 10.8 0 68.4  8.4
ITALY  26.3 16.4 0 80.1  3.8
LATVIA  33.1 7.5 0 80.7 2.7
LITHUANIA  51.1 14.5 0 67.7  3.8
MALTA  51.8 2.0 0 95.9 2.8
NETHERLANDS  28.9 9.6 0 78.9 8.8
POLAND  33.5 12.1 1 49.3  4.6
PORTUGAL  54.1 4.5 1 67.6 6.0
ROMANIA  35.2 25.5 1 77.3  3.0
SLOVAK 
REPUBLIC 
42.3 6.3 0 79.7 3.9
SLOVENIA  26.2 7.6 1 74.6 6.0
SPAIN  45.9 11.5 0 76.3  5.2
SWEDEN  43.5 7.0 0 85.9 9.2
UK  54.8 9.8 0 76.1 8.6
AVERAGE  40.0 9.9 76.9 5.8
EU AVERAGE  39.8 10.5 77.8  7.3
CEEC 
AVERAGE 
40.2 9.2 75.8 4.1
Note: See text for sources and definitions. 
 
Another variable that needs to be controlled for is election turnout. While a 
governing coalition may enjoy a strong majority in parliament, its public legitimacy 
may be weaker if turnout is low. Low turnout could be interpreted as protest from 
disillusioned potential voters, and as a signal of dissatisfaction with the entire political 
system. In such circumstances of alienation between voters and government cabinet 
members may not see themselves as envoys of public interest and internal squabbling 
might dominate politics and cause political instability. Thus, TURNOUT, the share in   25
percentage points of votes cast in total number of eligible voters, is hypothesized to be 
negatively correlated with cabinet reshuffles.
42 
Finally, corruption is an important cause of cabinet reshuffles. In democratic 
systems members of cabinet who are found guilty of, or in some case merely 
suspected of misconduct must step down. CORRUPTION is for each country the 
average level of Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index for the 
1995-1998 period.
43 The higher the score, which ranges from 10 to 1, the lower is the 
level of corruption, and the greater is government stability hypothesized to be. 
According to Table 9 MAJORPARTY ranges from a low of 18.9 for Belgium 
to a high of 54.8 for the UK. There was little difference in the 1990s between EU 
member states and CEECs, both groups featuring on average almost the same level of 
domination of parliament by a leading party. The parliaments of Bulgaria, Lithuania, 
Malta, Greece and Portugal, in addition to the UK, tended to feature a major party 
with more than half the seats. On the other hand, Elections in Slovenia, Italy, the 
Netherlands and Finland, in addition to Belgium, tend to be much less decisive, with 
no party earning more than a third of the seats.  
PARLNUMPARTY ranges from a low of 2 for Malta, where there are only 
two parties for many years, and 27.3 for France, where the national assembly 
traditionally features many factions and independents. Again, there is little difference 
between the two groups of countries, although the CEECs tend to have on average 
fewer parties in parliament. The countries with a presidential system are Bulgaria, 
Cyprus, France, Poland, Portugal, Romania and Slovenia, the majority of which are 
CEECs.  
TURNOUT is lowest at 49.3 in Poland, where voters seemed to have lost 
interest in domestic politics after the great enthusiasm in the wake of the downfall of 
Communism. The highest turnout at 95.9 is found in Malta, where the political system 
is no dull thing for the population. Exceptionally high scores are also found in 
Belgium and Cyprus. Turnout tends to be only a little higher in the EU than among 
CEECs. Finally, CORRUPTION is at its peak in Denmark, which is the least corrupt 
country in the sample, with an almost perfect score of 9.7. On the other hand, Latvia 
is the most corrupt country with a score of 2.7. Of all variables presented in Table 9 
CORRUPTION is the single one with a clear east-west differentiation: The CEECs 
clearly tend to be more corrupt than EU member states. 
Cabinet reshuffles are estimated using the following instrument equation 
(corrected for heteroskedasticity, standard errors in parentheses): 
 
                                                 
42  See footnote 39. TURNOUT is based on figures of elections for parliament in presidential systems 
as well as in parliamentary ones. For each quarter the figure for the recent election is applied. 
43  Based on the 2002 issue of Corruption Perceptions Index,  available at 
www.gwdg.de/~uwvw/icr.htm. Earlier periods are unavailable, and in some cases the average is 
based on shorter periods. National figures are averages of annual data. In the cases of Cyprus and 
Malta the index is unavailable for the entire sample period, and the 2003 issue of the Black Market 
component of the Index of Economic Freedom of the Heritage Foundation, available at 
www.heritage.org/research/features/index, is used in stead. The two indices differ in their scale and 
in their direction. Therefore, Cyprus and Malta’s index levels are calculated to have the same 
(inverted) deviation from the sample’s average as they have in the Black Market reading. Cyprus 
and Malta’s index levels are based on figures for 1999 only as this is the first year for which the 
Corruption Perceptions Index is available for all other sample countries.    26
(5) RESHUFFLES = 3.125 – 0.148* lnMAJORPARTY + 0.017*PARLNUMPARTY  
                (0.430) (0.089)
*                         (0.004) 
                 – 0.275* PRESIDENT – 0.008* TURNOUT – 0.660* lnCORRUPTION 
          (0.053)            (0.002)            (0.061) 
Adjusted R
2:  0.31     S. E: 0.273     
 
Table 10: instrumented cabinet reshuffles frequency for EU member states and 
CEECs for 1995-2001
44 
FRANCE Reshf. 
Freq. 
GERMANY Reshf. 
Freq. 
ITALY Reshf. 
Freq. 
UK Reshf. 
Freq. 
SWEDEN  0.759  SWEDEN  0.600 SWEDEN  0.822 SWEDEN  0.613
PORTUGAL  0.794  PORTUGAL  0.626 DENMARK  0.871 CYPRUS  0.634
DENMARK  0.807  CYPRUS  0.634 PORTUGAL  0.879 PORTUGAL  0.635
CYPRUS  0.810  DENMARK  0.650 UK  0.900 DENMARK  0.661
GERMANY  0.830  UK  0.677 GERMANY  0.904 GERMANY  0.677
UK  0.838  FINLAND  0.689 FINLAND  0.913 NETHERLANDS  0.695
FINLAND  0.846  NETHERLANDS  0.689 NETHERLANDS  0.922 FINLAND  0.698
NETHERLANDS  0.848  SLOVENIA  0.700 CYPRUS  0.923 SLOVENIA  0.699
SLOVENIA  0.870  IRELAND  0.749 SLOVENIA  0.974 IRELAND  0.760
IRELAND  0.911  MALTA  0.771 IRELAND  0.984 MALTA  0.772
AUSTRIA  0.937  AUSTRIA  0.773 AUSTRIA  1.015 BELGIUM  0.781
BELGIUM  0.952  BULGARIA  0.780 SPAIN  1.046 AUSTRIA  0.781
MALTA  0.954  BELGIUM  0.785 BELGIUM  1.056 BULGARIA  0.782
SPAIN  0.958  SPAIN  0.789 MALTA  1.080 SPAIN  0.797
BULGARIA  0.963  GREECE  0.799 FRANCE  1.080 GREECE  0.805
GREECE  0.975  FRANCE  0.830 GREECE  1.080 POLAND  0.833
POLAND  1.010  POLAND  0.832 BULGARIA  1.086 FRANCE  0.838
ESTONIA  1.015  ESTONIA  0.845 ESTONIA  1.113 ESTONIA  0.848
CZECH 
REPUBLIC 
1.034  CZECH 
REPUBLIC 
0.858 POLAND  1.125 CZECH 
REPUBLIC 
0.857
SLOVAK 
REPUBLIC 
1.066  SLOVAK 
REPUBLIC 
0.886 CZECH 
REPUBLIC 
1.150 SLOVAK 
REPUBLIC 
0.883
ITALY  1.080  ITALY  0.904 SLOVAK 
REPUBLIC 
1.193 ITALY  0.900
HUNGARY  1.124  HUNGARY  0.950 HUNGARY  1.227 HUNGARY  0.955
LATVIA  1.164  LATVIA  0.981 LITHUANIA  1.298 LATVIA  0.971
ROMANIA  1.169  ROMANIA  0.984 LATVIA  1.308 ROMANIA  0.976
LITHUANIA  1.186  LITHUANIA  1.008 ROMANIA  1.312 LITHUANIA  1.012
AVERAGE  0.956    0.792   1.051   0.795
EU AVERAGE  0.887    0.735   0.960   0.742
CEEC AVERAGE  1.030    0.853   1.149   0.852
Note: See note under Table 6. 
 
For the purpose of regression analysis RESHUFFLES is the bilateral annual 
frequency of cabinet reshuffles. In each observation it is the number of cabinet 
                                                 
*  Significance level of 9.51 percent. 
44  INRESH05.   27
reshuffles in the two countries combined during the sample period, divided by the 
number of years in the sample. LnMAJORPARTY and lnCORRUPTION are each the 
natural logarithm of the bilateral average score of respectively, MAJORPARTY and 
CORRUPTION. PARLNUMPARTY, PRESIDENT and TURNOUT are each 
calculated in each observation as a bilateral average.
45 Equation (5) supports the 
hypotheses made above. 
The figures in Table 10 are instrumented using Equation (5) and actual values 
for the 1995-2001 period. Each figure is the expected annual frequency of cabinet 
reshuffles in the two countries combined. For example, Italy and Romania are 
expected to have had between them on average 1.3 cabinet reshuffle every year 
between 1995 and 2001, or one reshuffle in nine months. On the other hand, Sweden 
and Germany are expected to have seen together 0.6 reshuffles each year, or a 
reshuffle once in every 20 months.  
Table 10 shows that in terms of domestic exchange rate politics the UK was a 
core country, with roughly the same average expected frequency as Germany (see 
third row from bottom). Both countries enjoyed high turnout rates and relatively clean 
politics. Germany also featured a relatively low number of parties in parliament, and 
in the UK politics were stabilized also by the existence of a dominant party. Cyprus, 
Denmark, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom formed a core with values below 0.7. On the other hand, France and 
Italy are not fit for the core because of their fragmented parliaments, low turnout (in 
France) and indecisive election results and corruption (in Italy). 
 
4.c. Estimating a political OCA index 
 The second step in the TSLS procedure is now repeated, this time including 
instrumented cabinet reshuffles (standard errors in parentheses, ins prefix denoting 
instrumented values): 
 
(6) SDE = – 14.84 – 0.298*OPENNESS + 2.689*insCYCLE  
          (5.876)  (0.043)            (0.527)                
                 + 0.614*insINFLATION + 29.39* insRESHUFFLES  
          (0.020)                (6.174)    
Adjusted R
2:  0.80     S. E: 18.58     
Again, Equation (6) supports hypotheses made above. The figures in Table 11 
are instrumented using Equation (6) and actual values for the 1995-2001 period. The 
CEECs are highlighted.  
The three bottom rows reveal that France and Italy are potentially less stable 
than Table 6 suggests. On the other hand Germany and the UK’s stable domestic 
politics make them better Euro members than economics alone would suggest. In fact, 
the UK turns out almost as good a core country as Germany is. Many countries show 
significant improvements versus Germany and the UK when domestic politics are 
considered. These are Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
                                                 
45  Thus, PRESIDENT scores 1 in 21 observations in which both countries have presidential systems, 
0.5 in 133 observations in which only one of the two countries has a presidential system, and 0 in 
171 observations in which none of the countries has a presidential system.   28
Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic and Sweden, but above 
all Cyprus and Slovenia. On the other hand, set back by domestic politics are Latvia 
and Lithuania.  
 
Table 11: political OCA index levels for EU member states and CEECs for 1995-
2001 
FRANCE OCA 
index 
GERMANY OCA 
index 
ITALY OCA 
index 
UK OCA 
index 
IRELAND  -2.03  IRELAND  -8.08  IRELAND  1.20  IRELAND  -7.05 
BELGIUM  1.99  BELGIUM  -4.96  BELGIUM  5.67  BELGIUM  -3.54 
NETHERLANDS  5.53  MALTA  -3.26  NETHERLANDS  8.24  NETHERLANDS  0.51 
MALTA  6.02  NETHERLANDS  -1.10  SWEDEN  9.21  MALTA  0.91 
SWEDEN  6.79  SWEDEN  0.02  MALTA  10.11  SWEDEN  1.98 
PORTUGAL  8.56  PORTUGAL  2.44  PORTUGAL  11.85  PORTUGAL  3.47 
DENMARK  9.48  DENMARK  2.65  DENMARK  12.01  DENMARK  4.68 
FINLAND  10.06  AUSTRIA  3.61  FINLAND  12.49  FINLAND  4.98 
AUSTRIA  10.54  FINLAND  4.25  AUSTRIA  13.32  AUSTRIA  5.50 
GERMANY  12.43  UK  7.39  UK  14.36  GERMANY  7.39 
UK  12.81  SPAIN  10.09  GERMANY  15.02  SPAIN  10.75 
SPAIN  15.99  ESTONIA  11.10  SPAIN  19.02  CYPRUS  12.75 
CYPRUS  19.23  SLOVENIA  12.36  FRANCE  20.84  FRANCE  12.81 
SLOVENIA  19.65  CYPRUS  12.40  CYPRUS  22.33  SLOVENIA  14.21 
ESTONIA  19.95  FRANCE  12.43  SLOVENIA  23.19  ITALY  14.36 
ITALY  20.84  SLOVAK 
REPUBLIC 
14.21  GREECE  23.86  GREECE  14.62 
GREECE  21.05  GREECE  14.71  ESTONIA  24.27  ESTONIA  14.72 
SLOVAK 
REPUBLIC 
21.79  CZECH 
REPUBLIC 
14.96  CZECH 
REPUBLIC 
26.01  SLOVAK 
REPUBLIC 
15.97 
CZECH 
REPUBLIC 
22.13  ITALY  15.02  SLOVAK 
REPUBLIC 
26.05  CZECH 
REPUBLIC 
16.41 
LATVIA  29.30  LATVIA  20.55  LITHUANIA  34.58  LATVIA  23.28 
LITHUANIA  30.50  LITHUANIA  22.46  LATVIA  34.68  LITHUANIA  24.98 
HUNGARY  32.05  HUNGARY  25.46  HUNGARY  35.52  HUNGARY  26.58 
POLAND  34.92  POLAND  29.01  POLAND  38.06  POLAND  28.15 
ROMANIA  52.25  ROMANIA  44.78  ROMANIA  56.89  ROMANIA  46.11 
BULGARIA  133.64  BULGARIA  125.70  BULGARIA  137.73  BULGARIA  127.99 
AVERAGE  22.22    15.53    25.46    16.90 
EU AVERAGE  9.57    4.18    11.93    5.03 
CEEC AVERAGE  35.12    27.48    39.12    29.34 
Note: See note under Table 6.
46 
 
The EU member states are still on the whole better Euro zone members than 
the CEECs. However, in terms of ranking, France, Greece and Italy are pushed back 
when domestic politics are considered. According to Table 11 and the normal 
distribution assumption (the 2.63 percentage points threshold), Germany and the UK 
could each form a currency union with Belgium, Ireland, Malta, the Netherlands and 
Sweden, and Germany could also link with Denmark and Portugal. Under the uniform 
distribution assumption (the 3.94 percentage points threshold), Portugal could 
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maintain a currency fix with the UK, and Austria with Germany. Germany could form 
a nine-country currency union including Austria. 
 
5.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
The results of this study confirm the validity of OCA theory in 1990s Europe. 
The sensitivity of exchange rate volatility to OCA criteria such as openness, intra-
regional trade, business cycle correlation and inflation was estimated and found 
compatible with the theory.  
Based on economic variables and data for 1995-2001 Germany was found to 
be the core of the entire group of EU member states and CEECs, having lower 
potential exchange rate volatility levels with the EU member states and CEECs than 
any of the other three major EU economies. This reflects Germany’s lead in economic 
integration with Europe’s countries. However, a sustainable currency union was found 
to be possible only among a few combinations of 2-6 countries. Assuming a normal 
distribution of exchange rates, each of the four major EU economies could form a 
currency union with Ireland and Belgium. The Netherlands could fit a currency union 
with the UK or Germany, and Malta could only link with Germany. Under the 
uniform distribution assumption, France could also allow the Netherlands and Malta 
in, Germany could form a six-country currency union including Austria, and Italy 
could link up with the Netherlands. According to 1995-2001 data none of the large 
four EU economies can be expected to sustain a long-term currency link with each 
other. The lack of sufficient integration among EU member states is alarming and has 
the potential to significantly destabilize EMU. 
These results, disappointing as they might be, represent an improvement 
compared with the 1992-1998 period. If the process of European integration is 
maintained, the sustainability of the Euro-zone could improve in a few years. 
Interestingly, the UK was the only one among the four majors to stagnate in its 
economic integration with the EU member states in the 1990s, and Germany was the 
most successful in integration. In other words, during the 1990s the UK has moved 
away in relative terms from the economic core of the EU. 
The CEECs are a long way from the level of economic integration with the EU 
member states that can sustain a currency union with them, in spite of the progress 
achieved. Estonia’s currency board, while strictly observed for most of the 1990s, is 
potentially unsustainable in the long run. Bulgaria’s currency board is even less 
realistic. On the other hand, Malta is an exception among CEECs, being part of the 
core, thanks to its openness and low inflation. 
This study also supports the arguments made by political economists regarding 
the relationship between exchange rate variation and domestic political instability. 
The greater is government instability the greater exchange rate variation was found to 
be. The Euro-zone would be more sustainable if its member states would have stable 
governments. This in turn was found to depend on decisive elections, low levels of 
parliamentary fragmentation, a presidential system, high election turnout and low 
corruption.  
Indeed, the picture improves upon the introduction of domestic politics, as 
German and British OCA index levels drop for thirteen countries, especially Cyprus 
and Slovenia. Considering the stability of its domestic political system the UK turns   30
out to be a rival core country to Germany. Both countries enjoyed in 1995-2001 high 
election turnout rates and relatively clean politics. Germany also featured a relatively 
low number of parties in parliament, and in the UK politics were stabilized also by the 
existence of a dominant party. On the other hand, domestic instability makes France 
and Italy unlikely core countries because of their fragmented parliaments, low turnout 
(in France) and indecisive election results and corruption (in Italy). Thus, Germany 
could maintain a currency with eight other small countries, of which only Malta is not 
currently an EU member state, and the UK could maintain a fix with six countries. 
Without long-term sustainability for a Franco-German currency union is EMU 
doomed to disintegrate? There are a few caveats to the conclusions of this study. First, 
it is important to note that if EMU survives its first years and integration does not 
stagnate, the currency union could yet become more solid. However, this depends on 
the ability of the EU member states to fulfill their promise to make the internal market 
more competitive so as to enhance both intra-regional trade and business cycle 
correlation. Intra-European trade hardly developed during the 1990s relative to GDP. 
Disinflation on the other hand is progressing rather well among the CEECs, and 
membership of the Euro-zone could bring a significant decline of inflation in them, as 
monetary policy is delegated to the ECB. In addition, EU membership will 
reinvigorate the CEECs regional trade. But then again, different debt levels, the 
natural price-equalization process
47 and the Balassa-Samuelson  effect could still 
maintain non-negligible post-membership inflation rate differentials.
48 
The second caveat is that the results presented here are based on data averages 
for 1995-2001. The advantage of any average is the moderation effect, smoothing out 
exceptional years and quarters. The disadvantage is that the average is slow to reflect 
new developments. Perhaps the results merely reflect the level of integration that 
existed a few years ago. However, the potential exchange rate variation between the 
CEECs and the EU member states is so high that even if EU-CEEC economic 
integration is greater than this study allows for the CEECs would remain unfit for 
Euro-zone membership for quite some time.  
Finally, as scholars have noted long ago, is that fiscal transfers can 
compensate to a certain extent for inadequate integration. Thus, the EU can ease 
tensions around EMU by putting together fiscal mechanisms to assist depressed areas. 
The political-economic cost-benefit balance is crucial in determining the extent of 
such fiscal transfers. It depends on how insufficiently integrated the members are, 
how big the aid recipient economies are, and how politically important to the donors 
is the membership of the recipients. That being said, France and Italy are too large to 
be paid to stay in the Euro. And however important their membership of the Euro-
                                                 
47  In any currency area with a low-income periphery and a high-income core, trade tends to bring the 
periphery’s low prices closer to the core’s high prices. The price convergence results in a higher rate 
of inflation in the periphery compared with the core. 
48  The Balassa-Samuelson effect is the persistence of substantial inflation differential among regions 
even in long-standing currency unions, due to changes in factor productivity in the different regions. 
Higher productivity growth in the tradable goods sector in low-income periphery countries 
compared with the non-tradable goods sector generates pressures for nominal appreciation of the 
currency. Since in a currency union appreciation is not possible the real exchange rate will be 
adjusted by a rise in the local price level. According to the ECB (1999, 42) this effect accounts for 
some 70 percent of inflation differentials in the current Euro area. Even in the US regional inflation 
differentials in the 1990s amounted to as much as 2 percent (Directorate General for Research, 1999, 
21).   31
zone politically is, they are potentially loosing competitiveness at a rate of between 
seven and nine percent a year against the German industry.
49 
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